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Robust Routing in Interdependent Networks
Jianan Zhang, and Eytan Modiano
Abstract—We consider a model of two interdependent net-
works, where every node in one network depends on one or
more supply nodes in the other network and a node fails if it
loses all of its supply nodes. We develop algorithms to compute
the failure probability of a path, and obtain the most reliable path
between a pair of nodes in a network, under the condition that
each supply node fails independently with a given probability.
Our work generalizes the classical shared risk group model, by
considering multiple risks associated with a node and letting a
node fail if all the risks occur. Moreover, we study the diverse
routing problem by considering two paths between a pair of
nodes. We define two paths to be d-failure resilient if at least
one path survives after removing d or fewer supply nodes, which
generalizes the concept of disjoint paths in a single network,
and risk-disjoint paths in a classical shared risk group model.
We compute the probability that both paths fail, and develop
algorithms to compute the most reliable pair of paths.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many modern systems are interdependent, such as smart
power grids, smart transportation, and other cyber-physical
systems [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. In interdependent networks,
one network depends on another to properly function. For
example, in smart grids, power generators rely on messages
from the control center to adjust to the power demands, while
the control center relies on the electric power to operate. Due
to the interdependence, failures in one network may cascade
to another. It is important to understand the robustness of
interdependent networks which are prone to cascading failures.
Most previous studies on interdependent networks have
focused on the network connectivity based on random graph
models, in the asymptotic regime where the number of nodes
approaches infinity [6], [7]. The finite-size arbitrary-topology
graph models, which represent real communication and phys-
ical networks, have been largely overlooked in the interdepen-
dent networks literature. A few exceptions include [4], [5],
which model interdependent power grids and communication
networks by graphs with topologies specified by the real
networks. Similarly, we abstract interdependent networks by
graphs with specified topologies, which can be tailored for a
wide range of applications.
In this paper, we study robust routing problems in inter-
dependent networks, by characterizing the effects of failures
in one network on the other network. For an overview of the
problems and challenges, it is helpful to consider a simplified
scenario where a demand network depends on a supply net-
work, illustrated by Fig. 1. Every node in the demand network
is supported by one or more nodes in the supply network.
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Thus, nodes in the demand network and nodes in the supply
network can be viewed as demand nodes and supply nodes,
respectively. Given that a demand node fails if it loses all of
its supply nodes, supply node failures may lead to correlated
demand node failures, which makes it difficult to route traffic
through reliable paths in the demand network. We develop
techniques to tackle the failure correlation. This simplified
one-way dependence exists in current systems. For example,
routers and processors in a communication network depend
on the electric power. Moreover, as we will see later, the
analysis based on this simplified scenario can be applied to
interdependent networks under certain assumptions.
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Fig. 1. Every node in the demand network G1 is supported by two nodes in
the supply network G2.
The robust routing problems have been extensively studied
under both independent failure and correlated failure scenar-
ios. If edges or nodes fail independently, the most reliable
path between a source-destination pair can be viewed as a
shortest path, where the length is a function of the failure
probability. In the case of correlated failures, it is difficult
to find a path with any performance guarantee in general
[8]. If correlation only exists among edges or nodes that fail
simultaneously, the network can be viewed using a shared
risk group model (Fig. 2) [9], [10]. The shared risk group
model captures correlated failures in an overlay network when
underlay failures occur, and is commonly used to study the
cross-layer reliability, such as logical link failures caused by
fiber failures in optical networks [11], [12], [13], [14]. The
most reliable path contains the smallest number of risks if
all risks are equally likely to occur, and can be obtained by
integer programming [11].
Interdependent networks have similarities with the classical
shared risk group model, in that two demand nodes share a
risk if they have at least one common supply node. However,
the key difference is that a demand node does not necessarily
fail if a risk occurs (i.e., a supply node fails), since a demand
node may have multiple supply nodes, whereas a node fails
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Fig. 2. A shared risk node group model, where nodes labeled by the same
number share the same risk.
if its associated risk occurs in the classical shared risk group
model.
The reliability of a path in interdependent networks, in
contrast to the classical shared risk group model, can no longer
be characterized by the number of risks that the path contains.
For example, if all the nodes in a path depend on a single
supply node and thus the path has a single risk, removing a
single supply node would disconnect the path. In contrast, if
every node in a path has multiple supply nodes, the path would
be more robust and can resist a larger number of supply node
failures, although the path has more “risks”.
In addition to the most reliable path, a backup path can
be used to further improve reliability, through diverse routing.
Intuitively, a pair of reliable paths should share the minimum
number of risks (or be risk-disjoint) in the shared risk group
model [11], [13]. However, in interdependent networks, it is
easy to construct examples where two paths that share many
supply nodes can withstand a larger number of supply node
failures than two paths that share a smaller number of supply
nodes (e.g., Fig. 3). New metrics, other than the number of
risks shared by two paths, need to be identified to characterize
their reliability.
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Fig. 3. The two numbers in each node represent its two supply nodes. The
two st paths in the left figure share two supply nodes, and can be both
disconnected after removing supply nodes {1, 2}. The two st paths in the
right figure share four supply nodes, but they cannot be both disconnected
after removing any two supply nodes.
Diverse routing problems have been studied under correlated
link failures. The correlation between a pair of logical links
is obtained either by measurement [15] or by analysis of
the underlay physical topology [16]. Heuristic algorithms
have been developed to find multiple reliable paths, and
their performance was evaluated by simulation [15], [17],
[18]. In contrast, we explicitly bound the gap between the
failure probability and the optimization objective, and develop
algorithms that have provable performance.
In this paper, we develop an analytically tractable frame-
work to study the following robust routing problems in inter-
dependent networks.
Single-path routing: Compute the probability that
a specified path fails. Obtain the most reliable path between a
source-destination pair.
Diverse routing: Compute the probability that two
specified paths both fail. Obtain the pair of most reliable paths
between a source-destination pair.
By generalizing the concept of disjoint paths to interde-
pendent networks, we characterize the level of disjointness
between two paths to study diverse routing. In contrast to
the classical shared risk group model where a node fails if
its risk occurs, in interdependent networks a node fails if a
combination of risks occur. In view of this, our methods extend
the shared risk group model. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to study the robust routing problem in
interdependent networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we state our model for interdependent networks and failures.
In Section III, we prove the complexity, and develop approx-
imation algorithms to compute the path failure probability. In
Section IV, we develop algorithms to find the most reliable
path between a pair of nodes. In Section V, we study the
diverse routing problem in interdependent networks, and find
a pair of reliable paths whose failure probability is minimized.
Section VI provides numerical results. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. MODEL
We consider a demand network G1 and a supply network
G2, where every demand node in G1 depends on one or
more supply nodes in G2. We assume that every supply node
provides substitutional supply to the demand nodes, and a
demand node is functioning if it is directly connected to at
least one supply node. To study the impact of node failures in
G2 on G1, it is equivalent to study the following model.
Consider a graphG(V,E,SV ), where nodes V and edges E
are identical to nodes and edges in G1, and SV are the supply
node sets, each of which is a set of nodes in G2 that provide
supply to a node in V . In this model, each node vi ∈ V is a
demand node, supported by a set of supply nodes Si ∈ SV ,
and vi fails if all the nodes in Si fail. (Note that nodes V may
have different number of supply nodes.) Finally, let s, t ∈ V
be a source-destination pair.
Under the condition that supply nodes fail independently
with given probabilities, and following the convention that
s, t do not fail, we study the robust routing problems in
G(V,E,SV ).
Remark. The analysis for this model can be directly applied
to interdependent networks, as long as the interdependence
is bidirectional (i.e., if v ∈ G1 depends on u ∈ G2, then
u depends on v as well) and failures initially occur in one
network. It suffices to observe that, given a set of failed nodes
S ⊆ G2, a node v ∈ G1 fails if and only if its supply nodes
are all in S. Notice that the failure of v does not further
lead to node failures in G2, because all the nodes that v
supports, which are exactly the supply nodes for v due to
the bidirectional interdependence, have failed.
III. COMPUTING THE RELIABILITY OF A PATH
If every node has a single supply node, the path failure
probability is given by 1− (1− p)r, where each supply node
fails independently with probability p and the path is supported
by r supply nodes. In contrast, if every node has more than one
supply node, computing the path failure probability becomes
#P -hard. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Computing the failure probability of a path is
#P -hard, if every node has two or more supply nodes and
each supply node fails independently with probability p.
Although it is #P -hard to compute, the path failure proba-
bility can be well approximated. We apply the solution to the
DNF probability problem and propose an (ǫ, δ)-approximation
algorithm based on importance sampling, which approximates
the path failure probability to within a multiplicative factor
1± ǫ with probability at least 1− δ.
The DNF probability problem computes the probability that
a Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) formula is true, when lit-
erals are set to be true independently with given probabilities.
A DNF formula is a disjunction of clauses, each of which
is a conjunction of literals, and takes the following form:
(x11∧· · ·∧x
1
n1)∨ (x
2
1∧· · ·∧x
2
n2)∨· · ·∨ (x
m
1 ∧· · ·∧x
m
nm). Let
v1−· · ·−vm be a path in G(V,E,SV ). The key observation is
that computing the path failure probability can be formulated
by a DNF probability problem, in which a clause Ci represents
a node vi in the path and the literals x
i
j in clause Ci represent
the supply nodes of vi. For completeness, we state Algorithm
1 that approximates the path failure probability, by adapting
the algorithm that approximates the DNF probability in [19].
The intuition behind this importance sampling algorithm
is as follows. Some events, although rare, are important in
determining the path failure probability, especially when the
path failure probability is small. The algorithm samples in a
space consisting of important events, each of which is a set
of supply node failures U that lead to the path failure. In this
space, the failure of U may appear multiple times, given that
multiple choices of vi in Step 2 may lead to the same U in Step
3. The algorithm then remove the duplicated U via sampling
in Step 4.
To prove the correctness of the algorithm, we take the
following two steps. First, following a similar analysis to
[19], we prove that the path failure probability is given by
E[I]
∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj ), where E[I] is the expec-
tation of I in Step 4 of the algorithm. Second, by repeating
the loop a sufficiently large number of times, E[I] can be
approximated to within factor 1 ± ǫ with probability at least
1− δ. The details of the proof can be found in the Appendix.
The advantage of this algorithm over a naı¨ve Monte-Carlo
algorithm (e.g., by repeatedly simulating the supply node
failure events and counting the fraction of trials in which the
Algorithm 1 Estimating the path failure probability based on
importance sampling.
Initialization:
1) Given a path {v1, v2, . . . , vm}, let {u
i
j|j = 1, . . . , ns(vi)}
denote the set of supply nodes of vi, where ns(vi) is the
number of supply nodes of vi.
Main loop:
2) Among {v1, v2, . . . , vm}, randomly choose vi with prob-
ability ∏
1≤j≤ns(vi)
p(uij)/
∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj ).
If every demand node has an identical number of supply
nodes, and the supply node failure probability p(uij) is
identical, then node vi is chosen with probability 1/m.
3) If vi is chosen, set all of its supply nodes {u
i
j|j =
1, . . . , ns(vi)} to be failed. The other supply nodes are
randomly set to be failed with their respective failure
probabilities. Let U denote the set of failed supply nodes.
4) Test whether vi is the first failed node among
{v1, v2, . . . , vm}, given that U fail (and no other supply
nodes fail). If true, set I = 1; otherwise, set I = 0.
Repeat the loop for a = 3m ln(2/δ)/ǫ2 iterations.
Result:
5) Count the number of I = 1 and denote the number by b.
An (ǫ, δ)-approximation of the path failure probability is
given by b/a
∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj ).
path fails) is that the number of iterations in the naı¨ve Monte-
Carlo algorithm is large when the path failure probability is
small1. In contrast, by sampling in a more important space, the
number of iterations is reduced. Note that the only quantity
that needs to be estimated in Algorithm 1 by simulation is
E[I], and that Pr(I = 1) ≥ 1/m. We conclude this section
by the following theorem, whose proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. The path failure probability can be estimated to
within a multiplicative factor 1± ǫ with probability 1− δ, in
time O(m2ns ln(1/δ)/ǫ
2), where m is the path length and ns
is the maximum number of supply nodes for a demand node.
Although the failure probability of a specific path can be
well approximated by the importance sampling algorithm, the
algorithm hardly gives an intuition for path properties that
characterize a reliable path. In the remainder of this section, we
develop indicators and bounds on the path failure probability,
which can be used for finding the most reliable path.
A. Small and identical failure probability
Consider a path v1−· · ·−vm in G(V,E,SV ). Let Fi denote
the event that all the supply nodes of vi fail. Let F denote the
1If F occurs in b out of a trials, Pr(F ) ∈ (1 ± ǫ)b/a with probability
1 − δ, under the condition that b = Ω(ln(1/δ)/ǫ2). The total number of
trials a = Ω(ln(1/δ)/ǫ2)/Pr(F ) is large when Pr(F ) is small.
event that the path fails. Clearly, the path fails if at least one
node vi loses all of its supply nodes (F = ∪1≤i≤mFi).
By the inclusion-exclusion principle, we have
Pr(F ) =
∑
1≤i≤m
Pr(Fi)−
∑
1≤i1<i2≤m
Pr(Fi1 ∩ Fi2)
+ · · ·+ (−1)m−1 Pr(F1 ∩ F2 · · · ∩ Fm). (1)
Directly computing the path failure probability is difficult,
given that there are
(
m
j
)
summations in the j-th term of the
inclusion-exclusion formula. We first reduce the number of
events in the inclusion-exclusion formula, and then further
simplify the computation under the condition that the supply
node failure probability is small and identical.
To reduce the number of events, some redundant events can
be ignored. For example, if Fi occurs only if Fj occurs, then
the event Fi is redundant in determining F with the knowledge
of Fj . To see this, note that 1) if Fj occurs, then the path fails
regardless of Fi; 2) if Fj does not occur, then Fi does not
occur as well. If the supply nodes of vj form a subset of the
supply nodes of vi, then Fi is redundant. With an abuse of
language, we call a node vi redundant if Fi (i.e., the state
of vi) is redundant. With this simplification, we derive the
following result.
Let ns(vi) denote the number of distinct supply nodes of vi.
Let nmins = min1≤i≤m ns(vi). After removing the redundant
nodes sequentially, let m¯ be the number of remaining nodes
that each have nmins supply nodes. The path failure probability
can be estimated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If every supply node fails independently with
probability p ≤ ǫ/m, then the path failure probability satisfies
(1− ǫ)m¯pn
min
s ≤ Pr(F ) ≤ (1 + ǫ)m¯pn
min
s .
Proof. We first reduce the number of failure events that appear
in the inclusion-exclusion formula by removing the redundant
nodes. Note that determining whether a node is redundant
and removing the redundant node are done sequentially. Thus,
among the set of nodes that have the same supply nodes, one
node remains. Let D denote the nodes in the path excluding
the redundant nodes.
First, we consider the first term in Eq. (1) that provides
an upper bound on the path failure probability, known as the
union bound. Let D1 ⊂ D denote the set of nodes that each
have nmins supply nodes, and let m¯ = |D1|. The remaining
nodes D2 = D \ D1 each have n
min
s + 1 or more supply
nodes. Thus, the first term of Eq. (1) is at most
Pr(F ) ≤m¯pn
min
s + (m− m¯)ppn
min
s
≤m¯pn
min
s + ǫpn
min
s ,
for p ≤ ǫ/m.
Next, we consider the first two terms that provide a lower
bound on the path failure probability (cf . Bonferroni inequal-
ities). For any pair of nodes vj , vk ∈ D, the union of their
supply node sets contains at least max(ns(vj), ns(vk)) + 1
nodes, because neither supply node set includes the other as a
subset. At least nmins +1 supply nodes have to be removed in
order for a pair of nodes in D1 to fail. At least n
min
s +2 supply
nodes need to be removed in order for a pair of nodes to fail
if at least one node belongs to D2. The absolute value of the
second term is at most
(
m¯
2
)
pn
min
s +1 + [
(
m
2
)
−
(
m¯
2
)
]pn
min
s +2. A
lower bound on Pr(F ) is
Pr(F ) ≥m¯pn
min
s −
(m¯2
2
ppn
min
s +
m2
2
p2pn
min
s
)
≥m¯pn
min
s − ǫm¯pn
min
s ,
for p ≤ ǫ/m.
For the special case where every node in the path has the
same number ns of distinct supply nodes, let m¯ be the number
of nodes, in the path, among which no pair of nodes share the
same set of ns supply nodes. The following stronger result
can be proved in a similar approach.
Corollary 1. If every supply node fails independently with
probability p ≤ 2ǫ/m¯, then the path failure probability
satisfies (1− ǫ)m¯pns ≤ Pr(F ) ≤ m¯pns .
Proof. If node vi and vj in the path share the same set of
supply nodes, then vi and vj must fail simultaneously, and
F = ∪1≤i≤mFi = ∪1≤i≤m,i6=jFi. Thus, in the calculation of
path failure probability Pr(F ), nodes that have the same set
of supply nodes can be represented by a single node.
Let {v¯1, v¯2, . . . , v¯m¯} denote the nodes in the path such that
the supply nodes of v¯i differ from the supply nodes of v¯j
by at least one supply node, i 6= j, m¯ ≤ m. The first term
of Eq. (1) is m¯pns , since every node has ns distinct supply
nodes and the probability that a node fails is pns . Moreover,
the union of the supply nodes of v¯i and v¯j has size at least
ns + 1, and the probability that both v¯i and v¯j fail (because
of their supply nodes’ failures) is at most pns+1. The absolute
value of the second term of Eq. (1) is at most
(
m¯
2
)
pns+1 ≤
m¯2pns+1/2 ≤ ǫm¯pns , for p ≤ 2ǫ/m¯. Therefore, Pr(F ) ∈
[(1− ǫ)m¯pns , m¯pns ] given that p ≤ 2ǫ/m¯.
Thus, we have obtained the following two reliability indi-
cators for a path. These combinatorial properties are useful
in finding a reliable path, which will be studied in the next
section.
• nmins : the minimum number of distinct supply nodes for
a node in the path.
• m¯: the number of combinations of nmins supply node
failures that lead to the failure of at least one node in
the path.
B. Arbitrary failure probability
In contrast with the case where supply node failure prob-
ability is small and identical, it is difficult to characterize
the reliability of a path by its combinatorial properties, with
limited knowledge of node failure probabilities. Therefore, we
obtain bounds on path failure probability that will be useful
in finding a reliable path.
First, we develop an upper bound on the path failure proba-
bility. Let p(vi) be the failure probability of node vi, under the
condition that each of its supply nodes uij fails independently
with probability p(uij). The path failure probability, under the
condition that the failures of V are positively correlated, is no
larger than the path failure probability by assuming that the
failures of V are independent.
Lemma 1. The failure probability of a path P where a supply
node uij fails independently with probability p(u
i
j) is upper
bounded by 1−
∏
vi∈P
(1 − p(vi)).
Proof. If nodes vi and ∪kvk do not share any supply node,
then the event that vi survives and the event that ∪kvk
survive are independent. Otherwise, if they share one or more
common supply nodes, the two events are positively correlated.
Therefore,
Pr(vi and ∪kvk survive) ≥ Pr(vi survives) Pr(∪kvk survive),
and
Pr(vi survives| ∪k vk survive) ≥ 1− p(vi).
The reliability of a path P = v1 − v2 − · · · − vm is given
by
Pr(P survives) = Pr(∪k∈{1,...,m}vk survive)
= Pr(v1 survives) Pr(v2 survives|v1 survives)
. . .Pr(vm survives| ∪k∈{1,...,m−1} vk survive)
≥
∏
vi∈P
(1− p(vi)).
Then, we develop a lower bound on the path failure proba-
bility. The intuition is as follows. After replacing a supply node
that supports multiple demand nodes by multiple independent
supply nodes with sufficiently small failure probability, the
path failure probability does not increase. In the original graph
G(V,E,SV ), consider a node vi ∈ V . Let U
i denote the
set of supply nodes of vi, let u
i
j ∈ U
i denote one supply
node, let p(uij) denote the failure probability of u
i
j , and let
nd(u
i
j) denote the number of nodes that u
i
j supports. Let
p˜(vi) =
∏
ui
j
∈Ui p˜(u
i
j) denote the failure probability of vi
if uij fails independently with probability p˜(u
i
j) = 1 − (1 −
p(uij))
1/nd(u
i
j). A lower bound on the path failure probability
is as follows, whose proof follows a similar technique in [20]
and is in the technical report.
Lemma 2. The failure probability of a path P where a supply
node uij fails independently with probability p(u
i
j) is lower
bounded by 1−
∏
vi∈P
(1 − p˜(vi)).
Proof. Let UP = ∪1≤i≤mU
i denote the set of supply nodes
for the nodes in path P . Let uij ∈ U
P denote one supply
node. Let nd(u
i
j) denote the total number of demand nodes
that uij supports. Let P
i
j denote the set of nodes in P that are
supported by uij and |P
i
j | = nd(u
i
j , P ) ≤ nd(u
i
j). We follow
a similar method in [20] to prove the claim.
Given the realizations of UP \ uij = US ∪ UF , where US
denote the survived nodes and UF denote the failed nodes,
there are three possibilities. First, each node in P has at least
one survived supply node in US , and P survives regardless of
the state of uij . Second, there exists at least one node in P
whose supply nodes are all in UF . Thus, P fails regardless of
the state of uij . Third, P survives if and only if u
i
j survives.
The last case occurs if for some nodes in P ij , all the other
supply nodes have failed except uij . The probability that P
survives is given by 1−p(uij). By replacing u
i
j with nd(u
i
j , P )
distinct nodes, each of which supports a node in P ij and
fails independently with probability 1 − (1 − p(uij))
1/nd(u
i
j),
the probability that all the nd(u
i
j , P ) nodes survive is (1 −
p(uij))
nd(u
i
j ,P )/nd(u
i
j) ≥ 1 − p(uij). In this case, each node
in P ij has at least one survived supply node, and the path P
survives.
Thus, by the law of total probability, the probability that P
survives never decreases after the above replacement.
After repeatedly replacing each supply node that supports
multiple demand nodes by distinct nodes, each of which
supports a single demand node and fails independently with
the specified probability, the demand node failures become
independent. Let p˜(vi) denote the failure probability of a
demand node vi after the replacement of supply nodes. The
failure probability of a path can be computed efficiently as
1 −
∏
vi∈P
(1 − p˜(vi)), and is a lower bound on the failure
probability of the same path in the original problem.
Let nd denote the maximum number of demand nodes that a
supply node supports, and let ns denote the maximum number
of supply nodes for a demand node. The following lemma
bounds the ratio between the upper and lower bounds. Its proof
can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 3. For any path, the ratio of the upper bound on its
failure probability obtained in Lemma 1 to the lower bound
obtained in Lemma 2 is at most (nd)
ns .
Proof. We aim to prove
1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p(vi))
1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p˜(vi))
≤ nnsd ,
given
1− p(vi) ≥ (1 − p˜(vi))
nns
d , (2)
which will be proved in Lemma 7.
Given p(vi), p˜(vi) ∈ (0, 1), with Eq. (2),
1−
∏
vi∈P
(1 − p(vi)) ≤ 1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p˜(vi))
nns
d . (3)
and
0 <
∏
vi∈P
(1− p˜(vi)) < 1.
Moreover, let
f(x) = 1− xn
ns
d − nnsd (1 − x).
Since f(1) = 0 and
f ′(x) = nnsd (1− x
nns
d
−1) ≥ 0,
for 0 < x ≤ 1 and nnsd ≥ 1, f(x) is an increasing function,
and
f(x) ≤ 0,
for 0 < x ≤ 1 and nnsd ≥ 1.
Let x =
∏
vi∈P
(1 − p˜(vi)) ∈ (0, 1), since f(x) ≤ 0, we
obtain that
1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p˜(vi))
nns
d ≤ nnsd (1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p˜(vi))).
With Eq. (3),
1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p(vi)) ≤ n
ns
d (1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p˜(vi))).
The claim is proved.
IV. FINDING THE MOST RELIABLE PATH
In this section, we aim to compute the most reliable path
between a source-destination pair s, t ∈ V in G(V,E,SV ).
We first prove that it is NP-hard to approximately compute
the most reliable path. We then develop an algorithm to
compute the most reliable path when the supply nodes fail
independently with an identically small probability, and finally
develop an approximation algorithm under arbitrary failure
probabilities.
Hardness of approximation:Although the failure probability
of any given path can be approximated to within factor 1± ǫ
for any ǫ > 0, it is NP-hard to obtain an st path whose failure
probability is less than 1 + ǫ times the optimal for a small ǫ.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 4. Computing an st path whose failure probability
is less than 1 + ǫ times the failure probability of the most
reliable st path is NP-hard for ǫ < 1/m, where m is the
maximum path length.
A. Small and identical failure probability
If every supply node fails independently with an identically
small probability, there are two reliability indicators: nmins
and m¯. Recall that nmins is the minimum number of supply
nodes for a node in the path, and that m¯ is the number of
combinations of nmins supply node failures that disconnect the
path. With the two indicators, the path failure probability can
be approximated to within a multiplicative factor 1 ± ǫ by
m¯pn
min
s , under the condition that p ≤ ǫ/m. Moreover, the
indicator nmins is more important (and has a higher priority to
be optimized) than m¯. We next develop algorithms to optimize
the two indicators.
Given a graph G(V,E,SV ) and a pair of nodes (s, t), the
problem of computing an st path with the maximum nmins can
be formulated as the maximum capacity path problem, where
the capacity of a node equals the number of its distinct supply
nodes and the capacity of a path is the minimum node capacity
along the path. The maximum capacity path can be obtained
by a modified Dijkstra’s algorithm, and can be obtained in
linear time [21].
However, it is NP-hard to minimize m¯, even in the special
case where every demand node has a single supply node. The
result follows from the NP-hardness of computing a path with
the minimum colors in a colored graph [12].
We develop an integer program to compute the path P
with the minimum m¯, under the condition that nmins (P ) =
minvi∈P ns(vi) is maximized. The following pre-processing
reduces the size of the integer program. First, compute k =
maxP∈P n
min
s (P ), where P is the set of all the st paths,
using the linear-time maximum capacity path algorithm. Then,
remove all the nodes that have fewer than k distinct supply
nodes and their attached edges, and denote the remaining
graph by G′(V ′, E′,SV ′). The removed nodes and edges will
not be used by the optimal path. Let V ′′ ⊆ V ′ denote the
nodes among which each has exactly k distinct supply nodes.
We aim to find a path VP where the number of distinct supply
node sets for VP ∩ V
′′ is minimized.
Let Si denote the set of supply nodes of i ∈ V
′′. Let SV ′′
denote the union of these sets. Let xij denote the flow variable
which takes a positive value if and only if edge (i, j) belongs
to the selected path. An st path is identified by constraint (5).
A node i is on the selected path if at least one of xij and
xji is positive. Let h(Si) denote whether removing supply
nodes Si disconnects the selected path. If a node i is on the
selected path and has k supply nodes, then h(Si) must be
one, guaranteed by constraint (6). All the other nodes either
do not belong to the selected path or have more than k supply
nodes, and their supply node failures are not considered. The
objective minimizes m¯, which is the number of combinations
of k supply node failures that disconnect the path.
min
∑
Si∈SV ′′
h(Si) (4)
s.t.
∑
{j|(i,j)∈E′}
xij −
∑
{j|(j,i)∈E′}
xji =


1, if i = s,
−1, if i = t,
0, otherwise.
(5)
∑
{j|(i,j)∈E′}
xij +
∑
{j|(j,i)∈E′}
xji ≤ 2h(Si), ∀i ∈ V
′′ \ s, t,(6)
xij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E
′,
h(Si) = {0, 1}, ∀Si ∈ SV ′′ .
B. Arbitrary failure probability
If nodes V˜ in a graph G˜(V˜ , E˜) fail independently, the
probability that a path survives is the product of the survival
probabilities of nodes along the path. The most reliable path
can be obtained by the classical shortest path algorithm, by
replacing the length of traversing a node v˜i by − ln(1−p(v˜i)),
where p(v˜i) is the failure probability of v˜i. It is easy to see
that the length of a path P is
∑
v˜i∈P
− ln(1 − p(v˜i)) =
− ln
∏
v˜i∈P
(1 − p(v˜i)). The shortest path has the smallest
failure probability 1−
∏
v˜i∈P
(1− p(v˜i)).
Compared with the above simple model, the difficulty in
obtaining the most reliable st path in interdependent networks
is the failure correlations of nodes V ⊆ G(V,E,SV ). The
failure probability of a path can no longer be characterized by
1−
∏
vi∈P
(1− p(vi)). Moreover, let s− · · · − vi − · · · − t be
the most reliable st path. The sub-path s− · · · − vi may not
be the most reliable path between s and vi. Thus, the label-
correction approach in dynamic programming (e.g., Dijkstra’s
algorithm) cannot be used, even though the failure probability
of a given path can be approximated.
Given the bounds obtained in the previous section, we pro-
pose Algorithm 2 to compute a path whose failure probability
is within (nd)
ns times the optimal failure probability. Recall
that the bounds on path survival probability are the product
of (original or new) node survival probabilities, which exactly
match the path survival probability in the case of independent
node failures.
Algorithm 2 An approximation algorithm to compute a reli-
able st path in G(V,E,SV ).
1) For each vi ∈ V , compute p˜(vi) as follows. Let u
i
j
be a supply node of vi with failure probability p(u
i
j).
If uij supports nd(u
i
j) nodes, let p˜(u
i
j) = 1 − (1 −
p(uij))
1/nd(u
i
j). Let p˜(vi) be the failure probability of vi
if uij fails independently with probability p˜(u
i
j).
2) Compute the most reliable st path assuming that vi fails
independently with probability p˜(vi). The most reliable
path can be obtained by a standard shortest path algorithm
(e.g., Dijkstra’s algorithm), by letting − ln(1− p˜(vi)) be
the length of traversing node vi.
Theorem 5. The failure probability of the path obtained by
Algorithm 2 is at most (nd)
ns times the failure probability of
the most reliable st path under arbitrary supply node failure
probabilities.
Proof. Let the path obtained by Algorithm 2 be P ′ and let the
path with the minimum failure probability be P ∗. Let p(P ′)
and p(P ∗) denote their failure probabilities. Moreover, let
p˜(P ′) and p˜(P ∗) denote their failure probabilities by assuming
that each node vi fails independently with probability p˜(vi).
We have p(P ′) ≤ nnsd p˜(P
′) ≤ nnsd p˜(P
∗) ≤ nnsd p(P
∗),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the last
inequality follows from Lemma 2.
Remark. If ns = 1 and every supply node fails independently
with an identically small probability, our result reduces to the
following result in the classical shared risk group model: The
number of risks associated with the shortest path is at most nd
times the number of risks associated with the minimum-risk
path [13].
V. RELIABILITY OF A PAIR OF PATHS
To study diverse routing in interdependent networks, we
consider the simplest case of two st paths in this section.
Given that computing the failure probability of a single path
is #P hard if every node has more than one supply node, it is
also #P hard to compute the failure probability of two paths2.
To see this, note that if two paths have the same number of
nodes and each node in the first path has identical supply
nodes as its corresponding node in the second path, then the
probability that both paths fail equals the probability that a
single path fails. Fortunately, we are still able to obtain 1± ǫ-
approximation of the failure probability in polynomial time.
A. Small and identical failure probability
A central concept in diverse routing is the disjoint paths
or risk disjoint paths [11], [12], [10]. In the classical shared
risk group model, if every risk occurs independently with an
identically small probability p = o(1/m2), the probability
that two paths fail is Θ(f(m)p2) if they are risk disjoint and
Θ(f(m)p) if they share one or more risks, where m is the
maximum path length and f(m) is a function of m. Thus,
risk-disjointness characterizes the order of the reliability of
two paths. In interdependent networks where every demand
node has multiple supply nodes, if nodes in P 1 do not share
any supply nodes with nodes in P 2, then P 1 and P 2 are
risk disjoint. However, risk-disjointness does not suffice to
characterize the reliability of two paths, for the following
two reasons. First, the failure probability of a demand node
depends on the number of supply nodes for it, which is
not related to risk-disjointness. Second, if P 1 and P 2 share
some supply nodes, the failure probability depends further on
the maximum number of supply node failures that the two
paths can withstand. To study the reliability of two paths in
interdependent networks, we define d-failure resilient paths as
follows.
Definition 1. Two paths are d-failure resilient if removing any
d supply nodes would not disconnect both paths.
Remark. In the classical graph model G˜(V˜ , E˜), two disjoint
paths are 1-failure resilient while two overlapping paths are
0-failure resilient. In the classical shared risk group model,
two risk disjoint paths are 1-failure resilient while two paths
that share risks are 0-failure resilient. Two paths can never be
more than one failure resilient. Thus, the disjointness or risk-
disjointness suffices to characterize (the order of) the reliability
of two paths in these models.
1) Evaluation of failure probability: Consider two paths
P 1 = s−v11−v
1
2−· · ·−v
1
m1−t, P
2 = s−v21−v
2
2−· · ·−v
2
m2−t
between a pair of nodes (s, t). We study the event that at least
one node in P 1 and at least one node in P 2 both fail. Let
F ki denote the event that all the supply nodes of v
k
i fail, and
let F k denote the event that the k-th path fails, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Then F 1 ∩ F 2 = ∪1≤i≤m1,1≤j≤m2(F
1
i ∩ F
2
j ). For simplicity
of presentation, let F both = F 1 ∩ F 2 and Fij = F
1
i ∩ F
2
j . Let
Sij denote the union of supply nodes of v
1
i and v
2
j .
2Meanwhile, it is still simple to compute the failure probability of two paths
if every node has a single supply node, by first computing the probability that
the first path fail, and then computing the probability that the second path fail
while the first path does not fail (i.e., none of the supply nodes of the first
path fail), both in polynomial time, and summing the two probabilities.
To decide whether two paths are d-failure resilient, we
consider the number of supply node failures that lead to
the event Fij , and denote the number by dij . Then d =
min1≤i≤m1,1≤j≤m2 dij − 1. Moreover, let m¯ be the number
of pairs of nodes, one from each path, such that each pair of
nodes in total have d + 1 distinct supply nodes and any two
pairs do not have the same set of d+1 supply nodes. (I.e., m¯
combinations of d + 1 supply node failures each disconnect
both paths.) The next theorem formalizes the connection
between the reliability of two paths and d.
Theorem 6. If every supply node fails independently with
probability p ≤ ǫ/(m1m2), then the probability that two d-
failure resilient paths with lengths m1,m2 both fail satisfies
(1− ǫ)m¯pd+1 ≤ Pr(F both) ≤ (1 + ǫ)m¯pd+1.
Proof. First consider the events Fij = F
1
i ∩ F
2
j , 1 ≤ i ≤
m1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m2. Let Sij denote the union of supply nodes
of v1i and v
2
j . Then the event Fij occurs if and only if all
the nodes Sij fail. By a similar argument as the proof of
Theorem 3, if Si1j1 is a subset of Si2j2 , then Fi2j2 occurs
only if Fi1j1 occurs, and Fi2j2 is redundant. In the following
we only consider S = {Sij|1 ≤ i ≤ m1, 1 ≤ j ≤
m2, none of Sij is a subset of another.}. The cardinality of
S at most m1m2.
By the inclusion-exclusion principle, Pr(F both) can be com-
puted as follows.
Pr(F both) =
∑
Sij∈S
Pr(Sij fail)
−
∑
Si1j1 ,Si2j2∈S
Pr(Si1j1 ∪ Si2j2 fail)
+ · · ·+ (−1)|S|−1Pr(∪Sij∈SSij fail). (7)
Since two paths are d-failure disjoint, the number of nodes
in Sij is d + 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m1}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m2}
while the number of nodes in all the other Sij is larger than
d+ 1. Let S1 ⊆ S be the union of the supply node sets, each
of which contains d + 1 nodes, and let m¯ = |S1|. The first
term in Eq. (7) is at most m¯qd+1+(|S|− m¯)qd+2. Therefore,
Pr(F both) ≤m¯qd+1 +m1m2qq
d+1
≤m¯qd+1 + ǫqd+1,
if q ≤ ǫ/(m1m2).
We next consider the supply node failures of two pairs of
nodes. Recall that S1 consists of supply node sets that each
contain d+1 nodes. Let S2 = S \S1 be the remaining supply
node sets that each contain d+2 or more nodes. The union of
two sets Si1j1∪Si2j2 (Si1j1 , Si2j2 ∈ S1) contains at least d+2
nodes. The union Si1j1 ∪ Si2j2 (Si1j1 , Si2j2 ∈ S2, or Si1j1 ∈
S1, Si2j2 ∈ S2) contains at least d + 3 nodes. The absolute
value of the second term is at most
(
m¯
2
)
qd+2 + [
(
m1m2
2
)
−
(
m¯
2
)
]qd+3. To conclude,
Pr(F both) ≥m¯qd+1 −
(m¯2
2
qqd+1 +
(m1m2)
2
2
q2qd+1
)
≥m¯qd+1 − ǫm¯qd+1,
if q ≤ ǫ/(m1m2).
2) Finding the most reliable pair of paths: From Theorem
6, we know that the probability that two d-failure resilient
paths both fail is smaller for larger values of d. Moreover, for a
fixed d, the failure probability is proportional to m¯, the number
of combinations of d+1 supply node failures that disconnect
both paths. We have obtained two reliability indicators for two
paths: d and m¯.
Unfortunately, computing the pair of st paths that have the
maximum d and the minimum m¯ are both NP-hard, even in
the special case where every demand node has a single supply
node. This special case reduces to the classical shared risk
group model. In this special case, d = 1 if there exist two
risk-disjoint paths, and d = 0 otherwise. The NP-hardness of
determining the existence of two risk-disjoint paths between
an st pair has been proved in [11]. Moreover, in this special
case, for two paths that share common supply nodes, m¯ is
the number of overlapping risks between the two paths (i.e.,
removing any of the m¯ supply nodes disconnects both paths).
The NP-hardness of the least coupled paths problem, which
computes a pair of paths that share the minimum number of
risks in the classical shared risk group model, has also been
proved in [11].
We develop an integer program to compute a pair of
st paths with the maximum d in G(V,E,SV ). Let variable
xkij denote whether edge (i, j) is part of the k-th path, and
let variable bki denote whether node i is part of the k-th path,
k ∈ {1, 2}. Same as before, let Si denote the supply nodes
of node i. Constraints (9) guarantee that two paths are node-
disjoint. Notice that these constraints can be dropped if there
is no restriction on the physical disjointness of two paths.
Constraints (10) guarantee that at least d + 1 supply nodes
need to be removed in order for one node in each path to fail
(i.e., b1i = b
2
j = 1, i, j ∈ V ), where M is a sufficiently large
number, e.g., twice the maximum number of supply nodes for
a demand node.
max d (8)
s.t.
∑
{j|(i,j)∈E}
xkij −
∑
{j|(j,i)∈E}
xkji =


1, if i = s,
−1, if i = t,
0, otherwise.
k ∈ {1, 2},
∑
{j|(i,j)∈E}
xkij +
∑
{j|(j,i)∈E}
xkji ≤ 2b
k
i , ∀i ∈ V, k ∈ {1, 2}
b1i + b
2
i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ V \ s, t, (9)
d+ 1 ≤ |Si ∪ Sj |+M(2− b
1
i − b
2
j), ∀i, j ∈ V \ s, t,(10)
xkij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E, k ∈ {1, 2},
bki ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ V, k ∈ {1, 2}.
A slightly modified integer program suffices to minimize
m¯ under the condition that d is maximized. Let h(Si ∪ Sj)
denote whether removing the union of supply nodes for i and
j disconnects both paths. Constraints (12) guarantee that if i
and j belong to two different paths, i.e., b1i = b
2
j = 1, then
h(Si ∪ Sj) = 1. Otherwise, h(Si ∪ Sj) = 0 in the optimal
solution. Let a positive value w(|Si ∪ Sj |) denote its weight,
which is a decreasing function of the cardinality |Si ∪ Sj |.
We aim to minimize the total weights of supply node failures
that disconnect two paths. In order to guarantee that d is
maximized, w(l)/w(l+1) should be sufficiently large for any
integer l, e.g., |V |2/2. Since there are at most |V |(|V | − 1)/2
pairs of nodes, larger d is always preferable and has a higher
priority to be optimized over m¯.
min
∑
Si,Sj∈SV
w(|Si ∪ Sj |)h(Si ∪ Sj) (11)
s.t.
∑
{j|(i,j)∈E}
xkij −
∑
{j|(j,i)∈E}
xkji =


1, if i = s,
−1, if i = t,
0, otherwise.
k ∈ {1, 2},
∑
{j|(i,j)∈E}
xkij +
∑
{j|(j,i)∈E}
xkji ≤ 2b
k
i , ∀i ∈ V, k ∈ {1, 2}
b1i + b
2
i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ V \ s, t,
h(Si ∪ Sj) ≥ b
1
i + b
2
j − 1, ∀i, j ∈ V \ s, t, (12)
xkij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E, k ∈ {1, 2},
h(Si ∪ Sj) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j ∈ V.
B. Arbitrary failure probability
1) Evaluation of failure probability: We use a similar
importance sampling approach to Algorithm 1 and formulate
the problem of computing the failure probability of two paths
as a DNF probability problem. A clause Cij represents a pair
of nodes v1i and v
2
j . Literals in Cij represent the union of
supply nodes of v1i and v
2
j . A literal is true if and only if
the supply node that it represents fails, and the probability
that the literal is true is the same as the supply node failure
probability. The disjunction of clauses is true if and only
if at least one clause is true, in which case both paths fail
because at least one node from each path fails. The rest of
the computation follows the same manner as Algorithm 1,
by replacing a node in Algorithm 1 by a pair of nodes. An
(ǫ, δ)-approximation of the failure probability Pr(F both) can
be obtained in O(m21m
2
2ns ln(1/δ)/ǫ
2) time.
2) Finding the most reliable pair of paths: It is more diffi-
cult to find two paths that have the smallest failure probability.
Recall Theorem 6. The failure probability of two paths is
Θ(f(m1,m2)p
d+1) if they are d-failure resilient when the
supply node failure probability p is small, where f(m1,m2) is
a function of two path lengths. As a corollary of the fact that
it is NP-hard to compute two paths that have the maximum
level of resilience d, it is also NP-hard to compute two paths
whose failure probability is within a factor α from the optimal,
where α is any function of the network size. Thus, we develop
the following heuristic. After computing the failure probability
p˜(vi) of a node vi in Step 1 of Algorithm 2, let − ln(1− p˜(vi))
be the length of traversing node vi, and compute two node
disjoint paths with the minimum total lengths. The two paths
can be efficiently obtained using a slightly modified shortest
augmenting path algorithm [22]. The computation is outlined
in Algorithm 3. The reason for the graph transformation in
Step 1 is to simplify the computation of a residual graph, to
which the shortest augmenting path algorithm can be applied.
Algorithm 3 A heuristic to compute a pair of reliable st path
in G(V,E,SV ).
1) Transform G(V,E,SV ) with node failure probabilities
to a directed graph G′ with edge failure probabilities
using the standard approach. (Split every node v into vin
and vout. Add a directed edge from vin to vout, which
has length − ln(1 − p˜(vi)). Add a directed edge from
v1out to v2in and a directed edge from v2out to v1in, both
with zero length, if an edge exists between v1 and v2 in
G(V,E,SV ).)
2) Compute the shortest path P ′1 from sout to tin in G
′.
3) Compute the residual graph. Remove all the edges in P ′1.
Add a backward edge from v′2 to v
′
1 with a negated length
if an edge from v′1 to v
′
2 is part of P
′
1.
4) Compute the shortest path P ′2 from sout to tin in the
residual graph.
5) Combine P ′1 and P
′
2 by cycle cancellation. The two paths
become node-disjoint and can be mapped to two paths in
G(V,E,SV ).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We study the robust routing problems in the XO backbone
communication network with 60 nodes and 75 edges [23], by
assuming that the XO nodes are supported by 36 randomly
generated supply nodes within the continental US. The XO
network topology is depicted in Fig. 4, and the supply nodes
are marked as triangles. The x-axis represents the longitude
and the y-axis represents the latitude. We do not claim that
the XO network needs supply from these randomly generated
points, and we use this example only to provide a visualization
of the robust routing problems using available data.
First, we assume that every XO node depends on two nearest
supply nodes and every supply node fails independently with
probability 10−2. Since the supply node failure probability is
small and identical, we are able to obtain the most reliable
path and pair of paths by optimizing the reliability indicators
using integer programs.
To identify the most reliable path, since nmins (P ) = 2 for
any path P , we only need to compute a path with the minimum
m¯ using the integer program in Section IV. The most reliable
path is colored red in Fig. 4, for which m¯ = 8. To evaluate the
path failure probability, by Corollary 1, setting ǫ = 4× 10−2,
Pr(F ) ∈ [7.68×10−4, 8×10−4]. To compare, using Algorithm
1, we obtain 7.9686 × 10−4 as a (1 ± 0.01)-approximation
of the path failure probability with probability 0.99. These
results suggest that the two reliability indicators (nmins , m¯) well
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Fig. 4. Topology of the XO network and randomly generated triangle supply
nodes. The most reliable Seattle-Miami path is colored red under the condition
that supply node failure probability is small and identical and every XO node
depends on two nearest supply nodes.
characterize the path failure probability when the supply node
failure probability is small and identical.
We compute the most reliable pair of paths connecting
Seattle-Miami using the integer programs in Section V. The
two paths are plotted in Fig. 5, and they are 1-failure resilient
(d = 1). The failure probability of both paths is approximately
1.0388 × 10−4. In contrast, the most reliable pair of paths
connecting Seattle-Denver are 3-failure resilient and their
failure probability is approximately 2.9800× 10−8. Thus, the
level of resilience well indicates the reliability of two paths.
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Fig. 5. The most reliable pair of paths between Seattle-Miami are colored red,
under the condition that supply node failure probability is small and identical
and every XO node depends on two nearest supply nodes.
Next, we assume that an XO node depends on Ns randomly
chosen supply nodes, where Ns is uniformly chosen among
1, 2, and 3. Let the failure probability of each supply node be
uniformly and independently chosen from [0.005, 0.015]. We
use Algorithm 2 to obtain a reliable path connecting Seattle-
Miami. Averaged over 10 trials, the path failure probability is
approximately 2.1032× 10−2, while the lower bound on the
failure probability of the most reliable path is 5.2365× 10−3.
The obtained path has failure probability around four times the
lower bound. Moreover, by using the heuristic to find a pair of
paths, the paths have average failure probability 3.9732×10−3,
which improves the reliability of a single path.
We compare the performance of the heuristic (Algorithm 3)
with the optimal pair of paths. Since it is difficult to obtain
the optimal pair of paths under arbitrary failure probabilities,
we use the integer program (11), under the condition that
supply nodes fail independently with probability 10−2. If
every XO node depends on two nearest supply nodes, the
failure probabilities of two optimal paths and two paths
obtained by the heuristic are approximately 1.0388 × 10−4
and 1.0773 × 10−4, respectively. If every XO node depends
on three nearest supply nodes, the failure probability of two
optimal paths and two paths obtained by the heuristic are
approximately 1.0200×10−6 and 1.0508×10−6, respectively.
These experiments validate the performance of our heuristic
algorithm.
Finally, we report the running times of the algorithms,
executed in a workstation that has an Intel Xeon Processor
(E5-2687W v3) and 64GB RAM. The integer programs that
find the most reliable path and pair of paths (under small
and identical supply node failure probability) can both be
solved within 1 second. The approximation algorithm to find
a reliable path and the heuristic to find a pair of paths (under
arbitrary failure probabilities) can both be solved within 0.1
second. The evaluation of the failure probability of one path
or a pair of paths by Algorithm 1 takes several minutes, by
setting ǫ = δ = 0.01. Thus, the algorithms (integer programs
and Algorithms 2 and 3) can be used to find reliable routes in
realistic size networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the robust routing problem in interdependent
networks. We developed approximation algorithms to compute
the path failure probability, and identified reliability indicators
for a path, based on which we develop algorithms to find the
most reliable route in interdependent networks. We also stud-
ied diverse routing in interdependent networks, and developed
approximation algorithms to compute the probability that two
paths both fail and to find two reliable paths. Our work extends
the shared risk group models, and provides a new framework
to study robust routing problems in interdependent networks.
APPENDIX
A. Computational complexity
In this section, we prove the complexity of computing the
path failure probability and finding the most reliable path.
Theorem 1. Computing the failure probability of a path is
#P -hard, if every node has two or more supply nodes and
each supply node fails independently with probability p.
Proof. The problem of computing the path failure probability
can be reduced from a monotone DNF counting problem. A
monotone DNF counting problem aims to compute the number
of satisfying assignments of literals, for a DNF formula that
has no negated literals. The monotone DNF counting problem
is #P -hard, even if every clause contains two literals [24].
(The original paper [24] considers conjunctive normal form
counting, monotone 2-CNF(SAT). It is easy to see the equiva-
lence between the monotone 2-DNF and monotone 2-CNF by
applying De Morgan’s law and negating all the literals.)
Given a monotone DNF counting problem, construct a path
as follows. Each node in the path represents a clause, and its
supply nodes represent the literals in the clause. (See Fig. 6
for an example.)
2
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Fig. 6. A path constructed from a monotone DNF formula (x1∧x2)∨(x2∧
x3) ∨ (x1 ∧ x3) ∨ (x1 ∧ x4).
If every supply node fails independently with probability
1/2, then the path failure probability is N/2m, where m is the
total number of supply nodes (literals), and N is the number
of combinations of supply node failures that lead to the failure
of at least one node, which equals the number of satisfying
assignments for the DNF formula. Thus, the failure probability
of a path under p = 1/2 gives an answer to the monotone DNF
counting problem. To conclude, computing the path failure
probability is #P -hard if every node has two or more supply
nodes.
Remark. We further consider the complexity of computing the
path reliability, with additional restrictions on the maximum
number of demand nodes that any supply node supports. If
every supply node supports at most two demand nodes, in
addition to the restriction that every demand node has at
most two supply nodes, then the failure probability can be
computed in polynomial time, when every supply node fails
independently with an identical probability. The computation
follows from the algorithm in [25], which relates the number
of satisfying assignments of a DNF formula, where each literal
appears at most twice and each clause contains two literals, to
the number of independent sets in a graph with node degree at
most two. Nevertheless, if every supply node supports three or
more demand nodes, the computation becomes #P -hard even
if every demand node has at most two supply nodes, because
counting the number of independent sets in a graph with node
degree three is #P -hard [26].
Theorem 4. Computing an st path whose failure probability
is less than 1 + ǫ times the failure probability of the most
reliable st path is NP-hard for ǫ < 1/m, where m is the
maximum path length.
Proof. We prove that computing such a path is NP-hard
even in the following restricted case. Consider a graph where
every node has a single supply node, and every supply
node fails independently with an identically small probability
p = o(1/m2). The failure probability of a path supported by
m¯ ≤ m supply nodes is 1− (1− p)m¯ = m¯p+ o(p).
Suppose that the most reliable path is supported by m¯min
supply nodes and has failure probability pmin = m¯minp +
o(p). For ǫ < 1/m ≤ 1/m¯min, a path with failure probability
strictly smaller than (1 + ǫ)pmin < (m¯min + 1)p + o(p) is
supported by exactly m¯min supply nodes. Computing a path
that is supported by the minimum number of supply nodes
in this example is NP-hard, which is known as the minimum
color path problem in [12]. Therefore, computing a path that
has failure probability within 1 + ǫ times the optimal is NP-
hard for ǫ < 1/m.
B. Approximating the path failure probability by importance
sampling
In this section, we prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 and
Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. The path failure probability is given by
E[I]
∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj ).
Proof. Let Vs denote the set of all supply nodes. Let U denote
a set of failed supply nodes that lead to the failure of at
least one of {v1, v2, . . . , vm} (i.e., the failure of the path).
Let U = {U1, U2, . . . , UR} denote all the sets of supply node
failures that lead to the failure of the path. Let p(u) denote the
failure probability of node u. Let Pr(exactly Ur fail) denote
the probability that supply nodes Ur fail and all the other
supply nodes Vs \Ur do not fail. Since the events that Ur fail
while the others do not fail are mutually exclusive for different
r, the path failure probability is given by
Pr(F ) =
∑
1≤r≤R
Pr(exactly Ur fail)
=
∑
1≤r≤R
∏
u∈Ur
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1− p(u)). (13)
Let {ukj |j = 1, . . . , ns(vk)} denote the set of supply nodes
of vk. Let mr denote the number of demand node failures,
among {v1, v2, . . . , vm}, if supply nodes Ur fail. Then, by
summing the failure probabilities of demand nodes p(vk) =∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj ), k = 1, . . . ,m, the probability that supply
nodes Ur fail is counted mr times.∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj ) =
∑
1≤r≤R
mr Pr(exactly Ur fail)
=
∑
1≤r≤R
mr
∏
u∈Ur
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1− p(u)). (14)
We now construct the relationship between the left hand
sides of Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) using E[I]. In Algorithm 1, the
value of I in Step 4 depends on both vi (obtained in Step 2)
and U (obtained in Step 3). In the remainder of the proof, we
first compute the probability that a specific U is obtained (in
an iteration of the main loop), and then compute Pr(I = 1|U)
(i.e., the probability that vi is the first failed node given that
U fail). As a consequence, Pr[I = 1] can be determined using
the law of total probability.
Consider an iteration of the main loop. Let Pr(Ur) denote
the probability that Ur is obtained in Step 3 of Algorithm 1.
Let r(t), t = 1, . . . ,mr denote the indices of failed nodes vr(t)
among {v1, v2, . . . , vm} if Ur fail (mr ≤ m). We have
Pr(Ur) =
∑
1≤t≤mr
( ∏
1≤j≤ns(vr(t))
p(u
r(t)
j )∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj )
×
∏
u∈Ur\{u
r(t)
j
,1≤j≤ns(vr(t))}
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1 − p(u))
)
(15)
=
∑
1≤t≤mr
∏
u∈Ur
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1− p(u))∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj )
(16)
=
mr
∏
u∈Ur
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1 − p(u))∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj )
. (17)
To see this, note that there are mr choices of {vr(t)|t =
1, . . . ,mr} which may lead to Ur. In Eq. (15), the first term
(in the product) is the probability of choosing vr(t) and setting
its supply nodes U r(t) = {u
r(t)
j |j = 1, . . . , ns(vr(t))} to be
failed; the second term is the probability that Ur \ U
r(t) fail;
the last term is the probability that the remaining supply nodes
Vs \ Ur do not fail.
Eq. (16) implies that vr(t), t ∈ {1, . . . ,mr} contribute
equally to the occurrence of Ur. Namely,
Pr(vr(t) has been chosen in Step 2|Ur)
=
( ∏
1≤j≤ns(vr(t))
p(u
r(t)
j )∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj )
×
∏
u∈Ur\{u
r(t)
j ,1≤j≤ns(vr(t))}
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1− p(u))
)/
Pr(Ur)
=1/mr,
for t ∈ {1, . . . ,mr}.
Given U r, the probability that vr(1) has been chosen in Step
2 of Algorithm 1 is 1/mr. Thus, Pr[I = 1|Ur] = 1/mr. By
the law of total probability,
Pr[I = 1] =
∑
1≤r≤R
Pr[I = 1|Ur] Pr(Ur)
=
∑
1≤r≤R
∏
u∈Ur
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1− p(u))∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj )
.
Since I is an indicator variable, E[I] = Pr(I = 1).
E[I]
∑
1≤k≤m
∏
1≤j≤ns(vk)
p(ukj )
=
∑
1≤r≤R
∏
u∈Ur
p(u)
∏
u∈Vs\Ur
(1− p(u))
= Pr(F ).
Next, we prove that E[I] can be estimated accurately within
3m ln(2/δ)/ǫ2 iterations.
Lemma 5.
Pr
(∣∣∣E[I]− b/a
E[I]
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫE[I]) ≤ δ,
where a = 3m ln(2/δ)/ǫ2 is the number of iterations of
the main loop of Algorithm 1, b is the number of obser-
vations of I = 1, and 0 < ǫ < 1. Namely, by repeating
a = 3m ln(2/δ)/ǫ2 times, one obtains an (ǫ, δ)-approximation
of E[I].
Proof. The proof is based on the Chernoff inequality and
is a standard result in estimation theory. From the proof of
Lemma 4, we know that Pr(I = 1|U r) = 1/mr ≥ 1/m for
all U r. Thus, Pr(I = 1) ≥ 1/m. To estimate E[I] within
1 ± ǫ accuracy (0 < ǫ < 1), let the number of trials be
a = 3m ln(2/δ)/ǫ2.
Pr
(∣∣∣∣
∑
1≤i≤a
Ii −
∑
1≤i≤a
E[Ii]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
∑
1≤i≤a
E[Ii]
)
≤ exp(−
ǫ2
∑
1≤i≤aE[Ii]
2
) + exp(−
ǫ2
∑
1≤i≤aE[Ii]
3
)
≤ 2 exp(−
ǫ2a/m
3
) = 2 exp(−
3 ln(2/δ)
3
)
≤ δ.
Finally we prove the time complexity of the algorithm.
Theorem 2. The path failure probability can be estimated to
within a multiplicative factor 1± ǫ with probability 1− δ, in
time O(m2ns ln(1/δ)/ǫ
2), where m is the path length and ns
is the maximum number of supply nodes for a demand node.
Proof. Consider an iteration of the main loop of Algorithm 1.
In Step 2, obtaining vi takesO(mns) time. In Step 3, obtaining
U takes O(mns) time, because the total number of supply
nodes is at most O(mns). In Step 4, testing whether vi is the
first failed node under the failure of U takes O(mns) time,
given that checking whether a node fail takes O(ns) time and
there are at most m nodes in the path.
Since 3m ln(2/δ)/ǫ2 iterations are sufficient, the total run-
ning time of Algorithm 1 is O(m2ns ln(1/δ)/ǫ
2).
C. Bounds on path failure probability
Lemma 6.
1− (1− p1p2)
αβ ≤ [1− (1 − p1)
α][1− (1 − p2)
β ],
for p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1), α, β ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Let
g(x) = (1− x)γ − (1− γx),
for x ∈ [0, 1), γ ∈ (0, 1].
By taking the derivatives,
g′(x) = −γ(1− x)γ−1 + γ;
g′′(x) = γ(γ − 1)(1− x)γ−2.
Since g(0) = 0, according to the mean value theorem,
g(x) = g′(ξ)x,
where 0 < ξ ≤ x < 1. Substituting g(x) and g′(ξ),
(1 − x)γ − (1 − γx) = g′(ξ)x
1− (1 − x)γ = γx− g′(ξ)x
1− (1 − x)γ = γx(1− ξ)γ−1. (18)
Given g′′(x) < 0 for x, γ ∈ (0, 1), g(x) is strictly concave
for x, γ ∈ (0, 1). For 0 < x1 < x2 < 1,
g(x2) < g(0) +
g(x1)− g(0)
x1
x2,
g(x2)/x2 < g(x1)/x1.
Given that g(x1) = g
′(ξ1)x1, g(x2) = g
′(ξ2)x2, 0 < ξ1 < x1,
0 < ξ2 < x2, and that g
′(x) is decreasing in x, we have
ξ1 < ξ2. If γ = 1, then g(x) = g
′(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, 1).
Clearly, there also exist ξ1 < ξ2 such that g(x1) = g
′(ξ1)x1,
g(x2) = g
′(ξ2)x2.
Applying Eq. (18),
[1− (1 − p1)
α][1− (1 − p2)
β ]
= αp1(1− η1)
α−1βp2(1− η2)
β−1
= αβp1p2(1− η1)
α−1(1− η2)
β−1,
for 0 < η1 < p1, 0 < η2 < p2, and
1− (1− p1p2)
αβ = αβp1p2(1− η3)
αβ−1,
for 0 < η3 < p1p2. Moreover, η3 ≤ min(η1, η2), because
p1p2 ≤ min(p1, p2).
Given 0 < α, β ≤ 1,
(1 − η1)
α−1(1− η2)
β−1
≥ (1 − η3)
α−1(1− η3)
β−1
= (1 − η3)
α+β−2
≥ (1 − η3)
αβ−1,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that h1(x) =
(1 − x)α is decreasing in x if x ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1], and
the last inequality follows from
α(1− β) ≤ 1− β,
α+ β − 2 ≤ αβ − 1,
and h2(x) = (1− η3)
x is decreasing in x for η3 ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore,
1− (1− p1p2)
αβ ≤ [1− (1− p1)
α][1− (1 − p2)
β ].
Lemma 7.
1− p(vi) ≥ (1− p˜(vi))
nns
d ,
where p˜(vi) is defined before Lemma 2.
Proof. For ns = 1, every node has a single supply node. Let
uij be the supply node of vi. Since 1− p(u
i
j) ≥ (1− p˜(u
i
j))
nd
for any supply node uij , the result trivially holds.
We next focus on the case where ns ≥ 2. Recall that p(vi) =∏
ui
j
p(uij) and p˜(vi) =
∏
ui
j
p˜(uij) (i.e., a demand node fails
if and only if all of its supply nodes fail), where uij are the
supply nodes of vi.
Consider two supply nodes of vi and let p(u
i
1) and p(u
i
2) be
their failure probabilities. Moreover, p˜(ui1) and p˜(u
i
2) satisfy
p˜(ui1) ≥ 1−(1−p(u
i
1))
1/nd and p˜(ui2) ≥ 1−(1−p(u
i
2))
1/nd .
Then,
1− p˜(ui1)p˜(u
i
2) ≤ 1− [(1− (1− p(u
i
1))
1/nd)
(1− (1 − p(ui2))
1/nd)]
≤ (1− p(ui1)p(u
i
2))
1/n2d ,
where the last inequality follows from Eq. (19), by letting
p1 = p(u
i
1), p2 = p(u
i
2), α, β = 1/nd, which we proved in
Lemma 6.
1− (1− p1p2)
αβ ≤ [1− (1− p1)
α][1− (1− p2)
β ], (19)
for p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1), α, β ∈ (0, 1].
Consider the third supply node of vi which has failure
probability p(ui3). We have p˜(u
i
3) ≥ 1 − (1 − p(u
i
3))
1/nd .
Moreover, notice that p˜(ui1)p˜(u
i
2) ≥ 1−(1−p(u
i
1)p(u
i
2))
1/n2d .
By letting p1 = p(u
i
1)p(u
i
2), p2 = p(u
i
3), α = 1/n
2
d, β = 1/nd
in Eq. 19, we have
1− p˜(ui1)p˜(u
i
2)p˜(u
i
3) ≤ (1− p(u
i
1)p(u
i
2)p(u
i
3))
1/n3d .
By repeating the process until all the supply nodes of vi are
considered, and let ns(vi) ≤ ns denote the number of supply
nodes of vi, we have
1− p˜(vi) ≤(1 − p(vi))
1/n
ns(vi)
d
≤(1 − p(vi))
1/nns
d .
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